Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Matter and Memory', 'New system of communication of substances' and 'Plato on Parts and Wholes'

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14 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]